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I test if parties matter with respect to the allocation of public expenditures in Germany. 
Considering the allocation of rights and duties due to the federal structure, two econometric 
models are estimated. First, a SURE model analyses spending at the federal level for the 
period from 1950 to 2003 and finds evidence for partisan politics and election year effects. 
Second, I examine the spending behaviour in the states from 1974 to 2004 in a panel data 
framework. In comparison to the federal level, policy has weaker impacts on the allocation of 
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The question, if whether parties matter has been an issue in political economics for several 
years. The partisan approach is tested with respect to different policy fields and a huge 
number of countries. Researchers find mixed evidence by applying several theoretical and 
empirical variants. However, most important at the beginning of such tests, a serious 
empirical investigation of policy differences requires the consideration of the government’s 
real room of manoeuvre in economic policy. Actually, in what way could economic policies 
really be different? Where is a government mostly free to choose and independent of external 
circumstances? Coming back to the roots of public finance, this paper will therefore examine 
the composition of the budget. E. g. Musgrave et al. (1994:49) denote the budget as 
“government program in numbers”. While policy via the revenue side is always a bit vague 
because of cyclical movements and the impact of the black economy, this is totally different 
on the expenditure side. Irrespective of the amount of revenues and expenditures and the need 
to take care of given allegiances, each government has to choose the purposes for which it 
will spend the revenues. It will prioritize. Different governments will have different 
preferences and spend the revenues with respect to their own and their partisans’ believes. Up 
to now, to the best of my knowledge, this point has not received any attention in the empirical 
literature. In this paper, I will therefore draw on that and provide evidence that parties matter 
in allocating expenditures for the case of Germany. 
1.2 Related  empirical  research 
The current empirical research testing the partisan approach examined public debt and the 
amount of public spending as objects of investigation in financial policy. Analysing the 
politics of different government types in OECD countries, Borelli and Royed (1995) find that 
government spending is higher under right than left governments. In accordance with the 
partisan approach, Cusack’s (1997) results show that the left increases the size of the public 
sector whereas the right reduces it. Blais, Blake and Dion (1993, 1996) get similar results. Discussion Papers   652 
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Alesina’s et al. (1997) evidence analysing public debt is mixed, it depends on the observation 
period. Moreover, there are several other studies testing for partisan politics in fiscal policy.1 
Single country studies for Germany mostly reject the hypothesis that parties matter in fiscal 
policy (e. g. De Haan and Zellhorst (1993)). Whereas these papers only consider the federal 
level, others just examine the state level. From an econometric point of view, the latter ones 
benefit from larger sample sizes. In addition, these papers analyze another facet of the fiscal 
federalism in Germany. Seitz (2000) primarily examines the fiscal policy of the German 
Laender. Explaining the amount of expenditures and debt with a panel data model in the 
period from 1976 to 1996, he does not find a significant impact of the party composition of 
the provincial governments. Referring to Seitz (2000), Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005) test 
different hypotheses of debt accumulation. They use a bigger sample, from 1960 to 2000, and 
apply a dynamic panel data method. However, they also cannot find any evidence that parties 
matter in fiscal policy of the German Laender. In contrast, Rodden (2001) confirms the party-
do-matter approach using panel data from 1974 to 1995: Left wing-governments spend and 
borrow more than right-wing governments. Oberndorfer and Steiner (2006) use a panel data 
set from 1985 to 2002 and come up with the result that parties matter with respect to the 
spending for universities in the German Laender.  
Hence the current paper is the first one that examines fiscal policy on the federal and the state 
level together because of the allocation of rights and duties due to the federal structure. 
Therefore, in addition, the findings might provide a contribution to the discussion about the 
autonomy of the German states and fiscal federalism (e. g. Blankart (2005): Chapter 28). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates falsifiable hypotheses originating 
from the theory of political business cycles. Section 3 briefly describes the institutional 
background in Germany by illustrating the federal structure and presenting the governing 
parties. Section 4 introduces the data on the federal and state level as well as their statistical 
properties. In section 5 the empirical models applying seemingly unrelated regression systems 
(SUR) are set up. Section 6 discusses the estimation results and section 7 concludes.  
                                                 
1 In Potrafke (2006) I test for political effects on the allocation of public expenditures in an OECD panel. Discussion Papers   652 
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2  Theory and Hypotheses 
The question whether parties matter or not stems from the huge literature of political business 
cycles. In this paper, the issue is if parties matter in allocating expenditures. My emphasis is 
not to find evidence for a single theoretical model.  However, as this hypothesis has its 
theoretical origin in the literature of partisan theory and political business cycles, the 
alternative hypothesis that parties do not matter would simply be incomplete. There is no 
doubt that one implication of the political business cycle approaches by Nordhaus (1975) and 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and others is that all the politicians will do the same policy. 
Ideology does not matter. Policies will converge. But in addition, they imply a particular 
pattern between elections on the one hand and the impacts of economic policy on the other 
hand. Therefore an empirical application of the partisan approach in this context should be 
amended by tests for these specific cyclical patterns. 
Nordhaus (1975)’ opportunistic school claims that politicians fool the public just to win 
elections. They will boost the economy right before elections. Thus applied to the purpose of 
this paper, I formulate as first hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1: Election years affect the size and pattern of public expenditures. 
The rational political business cycle theory by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and others criticizes 
the modelling by adaptive expectations and introduced rational expectations instead. In this 
approach, information asymmetries play a role as a source of the electoral cycles. The 
political incumbent tries to exploit his information advantage by signalling his economic 
competence before the elections. Hence, a testable hypothesis will be 
Hypothesis 2: Pre-Election years affect the size and pattern of public expenditures.2 
In contrast, the partisan approach focuses on the strong impact of party ideology. As a result, 
platforms and policies will not converge. Instead, right and left politicians will provide 
different policies by concentrating on the preferences of their partisans. The left party appeals 
more to the labor base and promotes expansionary policies, whereas the right party appeals 
more to capital owners and is therefore more concerned with keeping inflation down. This 
                                                 
2 Note that there is no explicit assignment between the two business cycle theories and hypothesis 1 and 2. 
Nordhaus (1975) approach does not necessarily imply that only election years matter as well as the one by 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) is also somehow related to the impact of election years.  Discussion Papers   652 
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holds for both sub-approaches of the partisan theory - for the classical one developed by 
Hibbs (1977) as for the rational one developed by Alesina (1987). The application of the 
partisan theory results in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The party composition of the governments affects the allocation of public 
expenditures. 
Beyond this, all-embracing hypotheses regarding the detailed way of allocating the 
expenditures by different parties are not easy to formulate because of two reasons. First, there 
is no specific theoretical model for the allocation process in combination with the partisan 
approach. Second, it is impossible to classify all the 20 expenditure categories on a left-right 
scale or even to assign them to a particular coalition type. However, more concrete 
hypotheses might be necessary because of fundamental reasons in empirical work. Therefore, 
I will formulate hypotheses for these (core-) categories for which a mapping on a left-right 
scale is clear cut and leave open the others. Hence Table 1 already presents the different 
categories of public expenditure. The signs “+” and “–“ indicate an expected increasing or 
decreasing effect of the political variables on the categories, respectively. 
Table 1.  
Expenditure Categories and hypotheses of the political effects 




1 General  Administration  –  –   
2  Foreign  Affairs     
3 Defence      – 
4  Public Safety and Order  +  +  – 
5 Legal  Protection      – 
6  Schooling    + + + 
7  Universities     
8  Other  Education     
9  Research beyond Universities       
10  Cultural  Affairs     
11  Social Insurance, Welfare and Veterans Support  +  +  + 
12  Health, Environment, Sports and Regeneration  +  +  + 
13  Housing and Land Use Planning  +  +  + 
14  Municipal  Affairs     
15  Alimentation, Agriculture and Forests      – 
16  Energy, Water Management, Industry and Services       
17  Traffic and Communications       
18  Companies (Public Sector)  –  –  + 
19  General Land and Capital Assets  +  +   
20  General  Finance     
 Discussion Papers   652 
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Moreover, coalitions consisting of two parties are standard in Germany. That is why it does 
not make sense to test for the effect of different types of government (number of coalition 
partners and minority governments) on the allocation of expenditures. 
3  Institutional background  
3.1 Fiscal  federalism 
Germany is a federal state. That is why the allocation of rights and duties between the federal 
level and the 16 states has to become clear before analysing fiscal policy. To keep the analysis 
manageable, I will ignore the lowest level of government and its political actors, the local one 
(communities). In principle, Germany’s constitution (Art. 30 and Art. 70 I) states, that as 
many as possible of the responsibilities should be with the states (German Laender). De facto, 
the federal government has most of the power. Considering fiscal policy, this fact mainly 
affects the revenue side of the states because the German Laender are barely autonomous in 
setting tax rates. Debt remains as the only discretionary source of financing their expenses. In 
contrast, the governments in the states possess some power on the spending side, namely they 
are somewhat free to choose the expenditures for the education system and cultural affairs. 
Seitz (2000: 186 ff.) and Rodden (2001: 6 ff.) give a more detailed outline of the fiscal 
federalism in Germany.  
A typical characteristic of Germany’s fiscal federalism is the fiscal equalization system. It 
harmonizes revenues across states. Transfers circulate from the federal level to the states 
(vertical) as well as between the states (horizontal). Since 1995, the New German Laender 
have participated in the system, so that the amount of payment has increased. Moreover, Seitz 
(2000:188) points out to distinguish between the two different types of Laender: “city-states” 
(Stadtstaaten) and “non city-states” (Flächenländer). That is why the budgets of the city-states 
also cover expenditures and revenues which are typically assigned to local authorities in the 
non-city states. In conclusion, the investigation of fiscal policy in Germany requires analysing 
the policy on the federal and state level in accordance with the allocation of rights and duties.  
3.2 Political  Parties 
There are two large parties in Germany, the left Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the right 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In Bavaria, Germany’s federal state with the biggest Discussion Papers   652 
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area, the conservatives are not represented by the CDU but by their sister party Christian 
Social Party (CSU). However, there is no party competition between them and they form a 
single fraction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). That is why I will label both CDU. All 
the chancellors as well as the prime ministers in the states were members of one of these two 
big blocks, SPD and CDU. Therefore, one can test for partisan effects just on this left-right 
dimension. Differentiating between left and right will simplify the classification of the 
expenditure categories. 
Furthermore, the much smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have 
played an important role as coalition partners. While the SPD has formed coalitions with all 
the other three parties, the CDU did never form a coalition with the Greens on federal or state 
level. I will also consider the impacts of the different coalition types because it might be that 
the simple left-right dimension may ignore ideological differences between government 
constellations in one camp (e. g. for the Left between SPD/FDP and SPD/GR coalitions). As 
minority governments and other government formations have played a negligible role, they 
will be subsumed under the named coalition types respectively (See Appendix A). I will not 
report the single regression results for simplicity reasons but discuss them verbally. 
4 Data 
4.1 Federal  Data 
The first data set contains yearly data for the total expenditure structure of the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the period from 1950 to 2003. Before the German Unification in 
1990 the data refer to the former federal territory (western part). The data are taken from 
Germany’s Federal Statistical Office (Fachserie 14.3.1, Funktionenplan). Missing data points 
for the period from 1950 to 1965 and for 2003 were provided upon request. Furthermore, 
single categories were made comparable to each other over time by the Federal Statistical 
Office. The expenditures are separated into the 20 different categories already given in Table 
1. I will use them as dependent variables for the examination of the allocation of expenditures 
on the federal level. 
As the states directly control for education and cultural affairs (categories 6 to 10), these 
categories are examined on the state level specifically. However, there also remains some 
power for the federal government, e. g. with respect to the construction of universities. Discussion Papers   652 
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Regarding the other 15 categories, the rights and duties are with the federal government, so 
that the provincial governments are not free to choose their expenditures. Therefore, these 15 
categories can only be used as dependent variables for the examination on the federal level. 
As the federal government has the control over these 15 categories, there are basically two 
sensible ways for the current analysis: Examining the pure expenditures on the federal level as 
well as the whole expenditures of the federal state (all jurisdictions together) because the 
states and communities have to obey the federal law. I analyse both, but will only report the 
results of the pure federal level. Thereby, the interaction between the federal and state level is 
considered adequately. 
To avoid spurious regression in the spirit of Granger and Newbold (1974), stationarity of the 
time series has to be checked. The common ADF-Test appoints 18 of the 20 series to be I(1) 
on the federal level, and 14 of the 15 series on the aggregate level.3 Nonetheless, I employ the 
first differences of all categories as dependent variables.4 5 
4.2 State  Data 
Data describing the expenditure structure on state level are available from 1974 to 2004 
(Federal Statistical Office) for 10 West German Laender. Like Seitz (2000), Rodden (2001) 
Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005) and Oberndorfer and Steiner (2006), I do not include the 
new Laender because of two reasons. First, corresponding data are only available since 1992, 
after the German Unification in 1990. Second, investments in infrastructure (e. g. in 
universities) caused over proportional high expenditures in the years after the Unification. For 
similar reasons I do not include Berlin, which was divided before the German Unification and 
therefore the data contain structural breaks. In accordance with the power of disposal in the 
states the following expenditure categories are examined as dependent variables: 
 
                                                 
3 On the pure federal level the series “Public Order and Safety” and “Universities” and on the aggregate level the 
series “General Finance” are reported to be I(0). 
4 With respect to the named series there could be a problem of over differentiation, thus generating a moving 
average unit root. But a uniform examination of the data justifies the chosen procedure.  
5 Cointegration between the dependent variables generally remains as an issue to take care of. However, in the 
considered case with relatively few observations and particularly many variables system cointegration tests are 
practically not feasible. In addition, even though cointegration would be present in some way, it would be difficult 
to model clearly because I do not consider a common error correction framework. As a result, I hope to explain 





3. Extraordinary  Subsidies  to the Education System 
4. Other  Education 
5.  Science, Research, Development beyond Universities 
6. Cultural  Affairs 
Note that in this data set six different categories reflect the expenditures for the education 
system and cultural affairs instead of five in the previous set describing the total expenditure 
structure of the federal and the state level together. This simply results from a more precise 
categorization inside of the state data set. Whereas the expenditures for “Schooling” and 
“Universities” are self-explaining, the other categories might be described a bit more in detail. 
“Extraordinary Subsidies to the Education System” are mostly transfers to students from low-
income families (BaFög), but also scholarships and grants. Further and adult education belong 
to the “Other Education” as well as e. g. language courses for resettlers (Spätaussiedler). 
Moreover, since 1996, spending for hospitals was excluded from the budgets of the states. 
The Federal Statistical Office calculated this effect back to 1992. Therefore, small breaks 
occurred in 1992 with respect to total spending and for universities because of the 
collaboration of hospitals and universities in medical science. I will control for this effect 
using a dummy variable. 
The problem of unit roots and cointegration generally also arises with panel data. As the time 
horizon with T = 31 is very short, microeconometricians might doubt any time series 
inference and therefore ignore respective considerations. However, applying simple ADF-
Tests, the single series are reported to be I(1). Since regressions with non-stationary variables 
will lead to inconsistent estimates, I use first differences to be on the safe side. Besides this 
statistical reason, it also has a good economic interpretation, namely that changes over time 
are examined.6  
 
                                                 
6 Unfortunately, taking first differences does not necessarily eliminate the problem of “spurious regression” when 
cointegration or panel unit roots are present. Corresponding tests and estimation methods are a topic of current 
econometric research (See e. g. Breitung and Pesaran (2005)). In the given framework with a system of 
equations, “second generation” panel unit root tests would be needed which also control for contemporaneous 
correlation between the time series. As before, particular tests do not seem to be reasonable because of the small 
sample size.   Discussion Papers   652 
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5  The empirical models 
5.1  A simple SURE model 
As all categories described sum up to total expenditure and the government has to choose for 
what it will spent its resources, it seems quite obvious that the expenditures for the single 
categories are correlated with each other. This correlation between disturbances from different 
equations at a given time is known as contemporaneous correlation (Judge et al. (1988: 443 
ff.)). The method of seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) controls for this 
contemporaneous correlation and provides efficient estimates (going back to Zellner (1962)).7 
Therefore, I consider the following structural SURE model with 20 equations to test for the 
impact of the parties in government on the federal level: 
∆log Expenditure Categoryj(t) =  β0j + β1j ∆log Gross Domestic Productj(t)  
+ β2j ∆log Populationj(t) + β3j ∆log Unemploymentj(t)+ β4j ∆log Debtj(t)  
+ β5j ∆log ∑i≠j Expenditure Categoryi(t) + β6j Unificationj(t) + δj Political Dummyj(t) + uj(t)   
 j = 1,…, 20  (1) 
Where the dependent variable Expenditure Categoryj(t) is a (T-2) x 1 vector and denotes the 
change in expenditure category j. Two degrees of freedom are lost because of two reasons. 
First, I take first differences. Second, formal statistical tests indicate substantial 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the single equations. Therefore, the data are transformed by 
a Prais-Whinston Transformation to correct for first-order serial correlation (see, e. g. Greene 
(2003), p. 271 ff.). I follow the related studies to include as explanatory variables for control 
purposes: The first differences of the change in GDP (Gross Domestic Productj(t)), the change 
in the number of inhabitants (Populationj(t)), the change in the unemployment rate 
(Unemploymentj(t)) and the change in the public debt (Debtj(t)). For this reason, the general 
economic situation, the demographic development, the situation of the labour market and the 
general budgetary position are taken into account. Furthermore, the change of the sum of the 
expenditures, the federal government is responsible for, is included as explanatory variable 
(∑i≠j Expenditure Categoryi(t)). The expenditures for category j must be excluded to avoid 
                                                 
7 In principle, the considered interaction between different expenditure groups could also be modelled by a Vector 
Autoregressive model (VAR). A VAR is basically a SURE system with autoregressive explanatory variables. This 
econometric set-up would be totally sufficient to test the given hypothesis, because I am not interested in the 
effect of some structural variables but only focus on that of the political variables. Unfortunately, specifying a VAR 
with 15 or 20 dependent variables may force the problem of too many insignificant regressors in an over 
dimensioned model. It is simply impossible to be set up properly in the given framework. Discussion Papers   652 
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endogeneity problems. Hence, the model controls for the general spending behaviour and 
implied allocation effects in each equation. The dummy variable Unificationj(t) controls for 
the effect of increasing expenditures after the German Unification in 1990. 
Most important, Political Dummyj(t) describes the political variables, on which this study 
focuses. Table 2 describes their mappings with respect to hypotheses 1 to 3.  
Table 2: 
Political dummy variables on the federal level 





The variables Election and Pre-Election take the exact timing of the elections into account. 
Following Franzese (2000), they are calculated as 
Electionj(t) = [(M-1) + d/D]/12 
where M is the month of the election, d is the day of the election and D is the number of days 
in that month. In Pre-Election years the variable is calculated as 
Pre-Electionj(t) = [12 - (M-1) - d/D]/12 
In all other years, their values are set to zero. Therefore, I directly control for fluctuations and 
the fact, that there are no fixed election dates in Germany. The election dates are reported in 
Appendix A.1. 
Hypothesis 3 will be tested on the simple left-right scale using the variable “Left”. The 
dummy “Left” takes on the value “1” in periods when a SPD chancellor was in office and 
zero otherwise. In election years, this type of government receives the value “1” which was in 
office for the longer subperiod of this particular year. For example, when the SPD/GR 
government followed the CDU/FDP government in the fall of 1998, this year was counted for 
the CDU/FDP etc.8 Appendix A.1 also gives a detailed description of the governments’ 
                                                 
8 In the alternative specification, the coalition type dummies take on the value “1” when the considered coalition 
type was in power and “0” otherwise. I distinguish between four different coalition types ruled in Germany since 
1950 on the federal level: CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD, SPD/FDP and SPD/GR.  Note that to avoid multicollinearity 
between these dummies, one of them must function as reference category. The estimated effects of the other 
dummies must then be interpreted as deviations from this reference category. Discussion Papers   652 
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succession in time elapsed. Hence the Election and Pre-Election year variables are of 
dimension (T-2) x 1. The variable “Left” is of dimension (T-5) x 1, because it is not defined 
in the period from 1967 to 1969 when the grand coalition ruled. 
5.2  A set of SUR equations in a panel data framework 
The expenditures for educational and cultural affairs on the state level are expected to be 
contemporaneously correlated for the same reasons as before. That is why, I will also control 
for it using a SURE estimation method. Different from the analysis on the federal level, there 
is also variation between the single states. Hence, I stay with the general structure of model 
(1) in a panel data approach: 
∆log Expenditure Categoryj(t) =  β0j + β1j ∆log Gross Domestic Productj(t)  
+ β2j ∆log Populationj(t) + β3j ∆log Unemploymentj(t) + β4j ∆log Debtj(t)  
+ β5j ∆log Compensation of Employeesj(t) + β6j ∆log ∑i≠j Expenditure Categoryi(t)  
+ β7j Equalizationj(t) + β8j Cityj(t)  + δj Political variablej(t) + uj(t)     
j = 1,…, 6  (2) 
where Expenditure Categoryj(t), Populationj(t), Gross Domestic Productj(t), 
Unemploymentj(t), and Debtj(t) are now N (T-5) x 1 vectors and denote the respective 
variables on state level. ∑i≠j Expenditure Categoryi(t) consists of the expenditures for 
education and cultural affairs, the governments of the states are responsible for (except 
category j). As before, the data are transformed by a Prais-Whinston Transformation to 
correct for serial correlation as well as heteroscedasticity.9 Imbalance of the panel causes 
further losses of degrees of freedom. The variable Compensation of Employeesj(t) 
(workplace) considers the economic development status. As before, I employ first differences 
of the change (logarithm) of all the economic control variables. The dummy variable 
Equalizationj(t) considers the fiscal equalization system. It takes on the value “1” for transfer 
payers and “0” otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable Cityj(t) controls for the difference 
between “city-states” (Stadtstaaten) and “non city-states” (Flächenländer). It is “1” in the case 
of the city-states Bremen and Hamburg and “0” otherwise. Moreover, two dummy variables 
are added because of the data preparation by the Federal Statistical Office. As mentioned 
above regarding the expenditures for “Universities”, a dummy variable controls for the effect 
                                                 
9 In total, 60 correlation coefficients were estimated and used to transform the data. Discussion Papers   652 
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of excluding hospitals from the budgets of the states within the observation period. Second, 
the spending for kindergartens was excluded from the “Schooling” category from 2002 to 
2004, which is also considered. 
In addition, the equation explaining the variation in the expenditures for Universities was 
supplemented by a dummy variable. As mentioned above, it controls for the effect of 
excluding hospitals from the budgets of the states within the observation period.  
The set up of the political dummies conforms to the one above.10 As before, the variable 
“Left” is not defined in periods with grand coalitions. Appendix A.2 covers the election dates 
as well as the exact government formations in every single state. The Election and Pre-
Election year  dummy variables are of dimension N (T-5) x 1, whereas another 14 observation 
points are lost using the variable “Left” because of grand coalitions. 
Table 3: 






The error term uj consists of an individual effect Zµµj and a stochastic component vj (Baltagi 
2001: 105): 
uj = Zµµj + vj    j = 1,…, 6 
where Zµ = (IN ⊗ιT) and µj
' = (µ1j, µ2j, … , µNj) and vj
' = (v11j, …v1Tj, … , vN1j, …, vNTj).  
To sum up, Baltagi (2001: 105 f.) concludes that each error component follows the same 
standard Zellner (1962) SUR assumptions imposed on classical disturbances. Furthermore, 
additional cross-equations variance components have to be estimated. However, as in a single 
panel data equation, the impact of the individual effect is of interest. If µj contains only a 
constant term (here β0j), then OLS will provide consistent and efficient estimates for βj and 
Zµ. If µj is unobserved, but correlated with the other regressors of the model, OLS will be 
                                                 
10 Regarding the specification with the different coalition types, two more government types have now to be 
considered because SPD and CDU ruled without coalition partners in some states. Hence, I distinguish between 
CDU, CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD, SPD/FDP, SPD/GR and SPD governments. With respect to the grand coalitions, I do 
not distinguish which of the two parties places the Prime Minister. As before, the periods of a CDU/SPD 
government act as reference category. Discussion Papers   652 
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biased and inconsistent because of omitted variables. In this case, the fixed effects approach 
solves the problem. A common F-Test will help to decide which estimation procedure to use. 
Random Effects cannot be present because nearly the whole population is used. There is no 
room for randomness in the current framework.  
6 Results 
6.1  The federal level 
Table 4 shows the regression results for the political variables on the federal level. It reports 
the coefficients and t-ratios for every single equation. By interpreting the coefficients, one has 
to be a bit careful. At first, I take logs of the levels so that the coefficients would reflect 
elasticities. In addition, I have to take first differences because of stationarity reasons. Thus, 
the estimated coefficients report the relative changes of the growth rates for the respective 
expenditure category. As mentioned before, it is impossible to test for a clear-cut pattern 
between every single category and coalition type in a sensible way.  Therefore, we will focus 
on the expected as well as notable single effects. To decide on the hypotheses, joint F-Tests 
will be crucial.  
In accordance with the political business cycles, I expect politicians to increase expenditures 
for categories which allow short run effects and affecting the preferences of the median voter 
before elections. Regarding the statistical significant effects in Table 411 the higher spending 
for “Housing and Land Use Planning” and “General Land and Capital Assets” seem to be in 
line with this claim. Higher expenditures for “General Land and Capital Assets” come along 
with lesser privatizations and thus be interpreted as preserving silver-plate before elections. In 
contrast, no intuitive explanation could be given for lower spending for “Public Safety and 
Order”, “Legal Protection” and “Traffic and Communications”. Higher expenditures for 
“Alimentation, Agriculture and Forest” and “Universities” do not seem to fulfil the 
preferences of the median voter, too. Marginal groups working for “Companies (Public 
Sector)” seem to be in a weaker position compared to the median voter. However, following 
                                                 
11 I do not include “Other Education” and “Municipal Affairs” because of too few observations for these categories 
on the federal level. The series for “Schooling” started in 1952 and the series for “Universities” in 1953. That is 
why T = 46 in this regression. In the alternative model for aggregate level (all jurisdictions together), “Municipal 






































Table 4:  











































































































































































































T  46 46 46 46 46 46 46  46 46 46  46 46  46  46  46  46 46  46 
t-ratios in brackets; */**/***: significant at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level. 
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this argument, politicians do not decrease spending for “General Administration” before 
elections. Moreover, the prospects that politicians might increase spending for “Schooling”, 
“Social Insurance, Welfare and Veterans Support”, and “Health, Environment, Sports and 
Regeneration”  before elections are not fulfilled. 
Furthermore, we see that left governments significantly affect specific expenditure categories. 
The effects on the educational and cultural expenditures are of special interest because of the 
respective examination on the state level. As expected, they strongly increase money for 
“Schooling”. I did not expect any specific effect on the expenditures for “Cultural Affairs”. 
The results show that left governments dispense more in this category on the federal level. 
Left governments gratify their clientele by strongly increasing the money for “Health, 
Environment, Sports and Regeneration”. This category includes all around environment 
protection and is thus one of the Green core topics. We also expected left governments to 
increase spending for “Companies (Public Sector)”. This hypothesis cannot be rejected by the 
findings.   
Finally, in line with the partisan approach, there should be higher spendings for “Defence”, 
“Public Safety and Order” and “Legal Protection” under right governments. But regarding the 
estimation results, parties do not matter with respect to these categories. It seems reasonable 
that because of the Second World War, external factors like NATO-contracts had a higher 
influence on the German expenditures for defence than internal ones. However, the empirical 
findings do not support the expectations concerning these categories. 
Most important for rejecting or not rejecting the falsifiable hypotheses if electoral effects and 
parties matter are F-tests on the political dummy variables. Therefore, referring to hypotheses 
1 to 3 I first check the joint significance of the political dummy, respectively.  Table 5 reports 
the results of the F-Tests. 
The hypothesis that all the Election variables are jointly zero is rejected. Thus, election years 
affect the allocation of expenditures (Hypothesis 1). The same is true for pre-election years. 
They also have a strong influence (Hypothesis 2). By rejecting the null hypotheses that all the 
variables “Left” are jointly zero respectively, the partisan approach is fully supported on the 
federal level. Parties do matter.  




F-Tests on the political variables. Federal level (left government) 
Variable  F-Statistic  P-Value 
Election** 1.66  0.0428 
Pre-Election*** 2.30  0.0017 
Left*** 3.48  0.0000 
*/**/***: jointly significant at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level. 
 
As mentioned above, I check other specifications which strongly support the findings. First, I 
use single coalition dummies instead of the variable “Left”. Thereby, the ideological 
differences between the different left governments (SPD/FDP and SPD/GR) are considered. 
These results clarify in detail, which type of government forces the preference for certain 
categories. For example, I find that the SPD/GR government is responsible for the higher 
expenditures for “Health, Sports and Regeneration”. The SPD/FDP coalition increases 
spending for “Housing and Land Use Planning”. From an explorative point of view, this 
resembles the social democratic policy of subsidized housing in the 70ies. The SPD/FDP 
coalition disburses less for “Alimentation, Agriculture and Forests” and thus does not attend 
the conservative clientele like farmers. Furthermore, I estimate the effects of the political 
variables on the aggregated expenditures over all jurisdictions for which the federal 
government is responsible for. The results match the ones of Table 5. I also find strong 
evidence for Election year and Partisan, but no Pre-Election year effects. Not surprisingly, the 
allocation differs slightly with respect to single categories. In conclusion, the allocation of 
expenditures under the control of the federal government is highly driven by the political 
variables.  
The evidence for the opportunistic business cycle as well as the partisan approach is not 
necessarily contradictory. First, the respective political variables do not continuously affect 
the same expenditure categories. Second, as pointed out above, the claim of the political 
business cycle theory is not simply the alternative to the partisan approach that parties do not 
matter, but also suggests a particular pattern between elections and economic variables. 
Moreover, Krause and Mendez (2005) argue that finding evidence for both approaches might 
not contradict because of party resemblance. 
To test the specification of the model, I first look for efficiency gains of applying SURE in 
comparison to OLS. Both estimators are equal, if there will be no contemporaneous Discussion Papers   652 
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correlation between the single equations (or completely the same regressors in every equation 
are used).12 The Breusch-Pagan-Tests for no contemporaneous correlation can not be rejected 
in every single case at 0 percent significance level. Hence, there are strong efficiency gains 
from using SURE in the considered model. Economically, the expenditures in one category 
are dependent of the expenditures in the other categories, as expected.13  
6.2 The  state  level 
In accordance with the estimation procedures for a panel data model, I first check a fixed 
effect versus a pooled regression. An F-Test that all the fixed effects are zero can not be 
rejected. Thus, I employ a pooled regression with a common constant which is efficient in this 
case. Furthermore, the control variables Equalizationj and Cityj are completely insignificant so 
that I drop them also for efficiency reasons. Applying the Breusch Pagan Test, the null 
hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation can be strongly rejected. Hence there are also 
high efficiency gains by estimating SURE in the current model. Table 6 reports the regression 
results.  
Again, for a further interpretation of the single coefficients in Table 6 one should keep in 
mind that I use first differences of logarithmic variables. Table 6 indicates that politicians 
increase the expenditures for “Schooling” and disbursed less for “Other Education” in 
Election years. While the first effect fulfills the prospects, there seems to be no intuitive 
explanation for the latter. 
                                                 
12  Note that the structural explanatory variables differ in every equation because of the Prais-Whinston 
Transformation. 
13 Unfortunately, the SURE method does not control for heteroskedasticity in the equations themselves. An 
examination of the single equations shows, that there is not always a constant variance which might cause a bias. 
My estimation results of the single equations with robust standard errors provide more significant political 
variables but nearly the same coefficients. However, it is very difficult to control for the correlation between and in 
the equations together. This particular parametric variance function is not easy to find. Even though a simple way 
for considering these two types of correlation together would exist, there would remain the trade-off between the 
uncertainty due to the FGLS-estimation and its information gain. Hence, as the contemporaneous correlation is 
very strong, I focus on that by applying SURE. Furthermore, I check the significance of the control variables also 
by F-Tests. They are all significant respectively. Discussion Papers   652 
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Table 6:  
Regression Results. State level: Effects of the political variables on the allocation of 
expenditures (left government)  
 Schooling  Universities Extraordinary 






























































N × T  246  246  246  246  246  246 
t-ratios in brackets; */**/***: significant at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level 
 
I expected left governments to disburse more for “Schooling”. In fact, the results do not 
support this hypothesis. Rather, left governments decrease spending for “Cultural Affairs”. 
Thus these findings are not in line with the ones on the federal level and they do not indicate a 
well definable policy of allocating expenditures for education and cultural affairs on a simple 
left-right scale. Using different coalition types instead of the variable “Left”, it is also difficult 
to identify the particular behaviour of specific governments. This effect is due to the impact of 
grand coalitions which are not considered in the current specification using the variable 
“Left”. Overall, the numerical effects are much smaller than on the federal level; all the 
coefficients of the political variables are smaller than 6 percentage points. This implies that 
the political determinants affect the respective categories, but do not fundamentally change 
their allocation. 
F-tests for the political dummies are used to decide whether parties matter on the federal state 
level. Table 7 reports the results.  
Table 7:  
F-Tests on the political variables.  State level (left government) 
Variable  F-Statistic  P-Value 
Election 1.54  0.1625 
Pre-Election 1.06  0.3818 
Left* 1.97  0.0662 
*/**/***: jointly significant at the 0.10/0.05/0.01 level. Discussion Papers   652 
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In contrast to the federal level, Table 7 does not report any evidence of political business 
cycles on the state level. Hypothesis 1 and 2 can be rejected. The reason for this finding might 
be that expenditures for education and cultural affairs only slightly affect the business cycle. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis that parties do not matter, can be rejected. These findings 
are partially supported by the model with coalition dummies instead of the variable “Left”. 
The five coalition type dummies together are significant at the 5.62 level. Pre-Election years 
do also have no influence, whereas Election years become jointly significant only caused by 
stronger single effects with respect to “Schooling” and “Other Education” as in Table 6. 
Again, the second specification confirms the result that parties matter and makes it robust. In 
comparison to the federal level, the allocation of expenditures in the states is not as strong 
affected by different coalition types and by the timing of elections. 
7 Conclusion   
This paper examines the allocation of public expenditures with respect to political effects for 
the case of Germany. Thereby, the budget becomes a new object of investigation for testing 
partisan and political business cycle approaches. The differentiation seems reasonable because 
the clienteles of the parties benefit differently. In fact, I find that parties matter in allocating 
expenditures, whereas the exact way they do is difficult to predetermine and to define because 
of the number of categories and coalition types. The differentiation on a simple left-right scale 
allows a classification of the core categories and the comparison of the federal and state level. 
The results become robust by estimating different specifications. Consequently, the 
examination of several expenditure categories provides a respectable data set for a single 
country study. However, from a statistical point of view, the number of observations remains 
small and therefore the results must be handled with care. 
Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, I take Germany’s federal structure into account 
by examining the federal as well as the state level. Analysing fiscal policy in Germany needs 
to consider the allocation of rights and duties between the jurisdictions. All the more, the 
empirical findings are interesting regarding the effects on the federal level in comparison to 
the states. First, governments on the federal and state level seem to have different preferences 
to allocate expenditures for cultural affairs. Second, there are structural differences between 
policies on these two levels. Politicians change the allocation of expenditures for education 
and cultural affairs much more than their colleagues in the states. Hence these findings might Discussion Papers   652 
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also be interpreted as evidence for the small influence of the states in the German federal 
system. 
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A.  Election dates and party composition of the governments 
A.1 The federal level 
Elections were held in: 06-Sep-1953, 15-Sep-1957, 17-Sep-1961, 19-Sep-1965, 28-Sep-1969, 
19-Nov-1972, 03-Oct-1976, 05-Oct-1980, 06-March-1983, 25-June-1987, 02-Dec-1990, 16-
Oct-1994, 27-Sep-1998, 22-Sep-2002 and 18-Sep-2005. 
A.2 The state level 
Table 8:  
Election dates in the states from 1974 to 2005 
Baden-
Wuertemberg 




























































































Source: Statistical State Offices 
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The first government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the period from 1949 to 1953 
consisted of members from three different parties: CDU, FDP and DP (Deutsche Partei). In 
the successive government, there were also ministers from the BHE (Gesamtdeutscher 
Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten) and the FVP (Freie Volkspartei). 
Since these coalitions were a result of the young democracy in Germany after the Second 
World War, I label the period from 1950 to 1957 as CDU/FDP. These governments were in 
accord with the period from 1958 to 1966 in which a pure CDU/FDP government was in 
power. During the next three years, a Grand Coalition (CDU/SPD) reigned. Then a SPD/FDP 
government took over up to 1982. From 1983 to 1998 a CDU/FDP government was in office, 
while SPD/GR government ruled from 1999.  
In  Baden-Wuertemberg the CDU was in power up to 1991, then a grand coalition 
(CDU/SPD) took over for four years and from 1996 to 2004 it was ruled by a CDU/FDP 
coalition. There were no coalitions in Bavaria during the whole observation period: The CDU 
(CSU) was in power all the time. The SPD reigned in Bremen up to 1991. Then, a coalition 
consisting of SPD, FDP and the Green-Party was in office for three years. I label this coalition 
as SPD/FDP coalition because the FDP hold more mandates in Bremen’s parliament than the 
Greens. After that, a grand coalition took over. Hamburg was ruled by a SPD/FDP coalition 
from 1974 to 1977. Then SPD reigned alone up to 1986, whereas from 1987 to 1990 there 
was again a SPD/FDP government and from 1991 to 1993 the SPD was in office once more. 
In the period from 1993 to 1997, the SPD formed a coalition with the so called “Statt-Partei”. 
I label this period also as SPD regnancy. Then, there was a SPD/GR government from 1998 to 
2001. Then in 2002 and 2003, there was a coalition consisting of the CDU, FDP and the so 
called “Schill-Partei” in office. I label this coalition as CDU/FDP. From 2004 the CDU 
reigned alone. In Hesse, a SPD/FDP coalition was in office up to 1982 and afterwards a 
SPD/GR government up to 1986. A CDU/FDP coalition was in power from 1987 to 1990. 
Then again a SPD/GR coalition took over up to 1998. Since 1999, a CDU/FDP government 
reigned. In Lower Saxony, a SPD/FDP coalition ruled up to 1977. From 1978 to 1985 the 
CDU reigned alone, whereas it must share the power from 1986 to 1989 with the FDP. A 
SPD/GR government followed for four years and in 1994 the SPD could get the whole power. 
In 2003, a CDU/FDP government took over. North Rhine-Westphalia was ruled by the SPD 
during the whole observation period. In Rhineland-Palatinate, the CDU reigned alone up to 
1986. Then a CDU/FDP government followed for four years. In 1991, a SPD/FDP Discussion Papers   652 
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government took over. In Saarland, the CDU ruled from 1974 to 1976. Then a CDU/FDP 
government was in power up to 1984 (In 1977, there was reorganisation of the cabinet beyond 
the regular elections (cabinet Roeder V). From 1985 to 1999 the SPD was in power alone, 
whereas from 2000 the CDU reigned. The CDU reigned in Schleswig-Holstein up to 1987. 
Then, the SPD ruled alone up to 1995. From 1996 there was a SPD/GR coalition. 
 